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A challenge in the development of aggregate indexes of trade protection is finding 
weights to put on various tariffs that a) reflect their importance to exporters and b) are not 
endogenous to the protection being measured. One common basis for weights is actual 
imports; but these, as is well-known, are endogenous. Various authors have worked to 
correct this endogeneity, but doing so is difficult in product areas where protection is 
both high and widespread. For this reason, I develop a new set of estimates of overall 
protection in rich countries with respect to developing ones that eschews import weights 
as much as possible in favor of weights based on the value of exporter’s total production 
in each product area. The results are generally much higher than those from the Bouët et 
al. (2004) “MAcMap” data set; there, weights are based on imports of large reference 
groups of countries. I conclude that product areas in which protection is high and wide-
spread are systematically de-emphasized when using pure MAcMap weights to aggregate 
across major product groups. In particular, when gauging rich-country protection with 
respect to developing countries, agriculture is de-emphasized. I also develop estimates of 
trade-distorting subsidies by country and commodity and translate these into tariff-
equivalents with the methodology of Cline (2004) in order to estimate overall protection 
levels. Agricultural tariffs dominate subsidies in trade-distorting effect, and agricultural 
protection in turn dominates goods protection generally. Japan is most protective, largely 
because of rice tariffs near 900%, followed by Norway and Switzerland. Because of their 
greater reliance on agriculture, the poorest countries face higher trade barriers than 






























Abstract. A challenge in the development of aggregate indexes of trade protection is weighting individ-
ual tariffs in ways that a) reflect their importance and b) are not endogenous to the protection being 
measured. The most obvious basis for weights is actual imports; but these may be highly endogenous. 
Various authors have worked to correct this endogeneity. For example, in the Bouët et al. (2004) 
“MAcMap” data set, weights are based on imports of reference groups of countries. But eliminating the 
endogeneity is difficult in product areas where protection is high and widespread. I develop a new set of 
estimates of overall protection in rich countries with respect to developing ones that eschews import 
weights as much as possible in favor of weights based on the value of exporter’s total production. The 
results are generally higher than those of Bouët et al. Product areas in which protection is high and 
widespread seem systematically de-emphasized when using MAcMap weights, especially in agriculture. 
I also estimate tariff equivalents of trade-distorting subsidies by country and commodity. Agricultural 
tariffs dominate subsidies in trade-distorting effect, and agricultural protection in turn dominates goods 
protection generally. Japan is most protective, largely because of rice tariffs near 900%, followed by 
Norway and Switzerland. Because of their greater reliance on agriculture, the poorest countries face the 
highest barriers, despite tariff preferences. 
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Rich-country trade barriers to the exports of poor countries have been a high-profile issue in the current, 
struggling negotiations to revise the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. The substrates upon 
which trade negotiators work are the thousand-line tariff schedules maintained by their customs authori-
ties, along with complicated non-tariff barriers including quotas and subsidies. But among both negotia-
tors and interested observers, there has long been an interest in aggregate measures of protection. Which 
product groups have the highest barriers? Which countries face the highest protection and which impose 
it? Those who observe and influence the negotiations, including politicians, non-governmental groups, 
and journalists, seek the big picture. For negotiators, the interest arises in part out of the search for recip-
rocating cross-sector deals, which create a need to compare, say, France’s agricultural protection with 
Brazil’s steel protection (Cooper 1966).  
 
The need for the big picture has long led economists to developed aggregate indexes of protection, usu-
ally expressed in ad valorem tariff-equivalent terms (Corden 1966; Cooper 1966; Basevi 1971; Ander-
son and Neary 1994, 1996, 2003; OECD 1997; Bouët et al. 2004; Cline 2002, 2004; IMF 2005; Kee, 
Nicita, and Olarreaga 2004, 2006). The approaches can be classified in various ways. Some are expedi-
ent, others more theoretically sound. Some are partial equilibrium, some general. Different indexes also 
mean different things and answer different questions. For example, the interest in the domestic implica-
tions of a country’s own trade policies has often led to weighting of border measures by the value of 
domestic production in each sector (Basevi 1971). 
 
Here, however, motivated by the recent controversy, we are interested in how a country’s barriers affect 
other countries, in particular, how each rich country’s barriers affect poor ones as a group.
2 The ap-
                                                 
2 This work is part of the Commitment to Development Index (Roodman 2006a), which rates the “development friendliness” 
of rich countries in trade and other policy areas.   2
proach we take is simpler than that of Kee, Nicita, and Olarreaga, who run thousands of regressions in 
order to estimate 315,451 distinct import elasticities in various countries (as one step in their calcula-
tion). Taking a weighted average of individual barriers, the approach is akin to that of Bouët et al. 
(2004). But it incorporates agricultural subsidies, and avoids what appears to be a problem of endogene-
ity in their weights. 
 
The challenges in developing aggregate measures of trade policy are well known. The raw data on tariffs 
and other barriers are complex and often incomplete. Tariff line divisions below the 6-digit level vary by 
country. It is hard to estimate key parameters, such as supply and demand elasticities, that determine 
welfare cost of various barriers. But without an understanding of the costs, it is hard to know, for exam-
ple, whether a tariff twice as high is twice as bad. There are theoretical challenges in comparing barriers, 
such as tariffs and quotas, that are fundamentally different.  
 
In addition, there is the challenge of weighting. Tariffs against major goods obviously matter more than 
those against obscure ones, and so ought to be given more weight. But what should be the basis for 
weights? One natural choice is the value of imports of the good in question, especially tempting since 
imports data are often available at the same resolution as tariff data. But this leads to an old endogeneity 
problem: categories with the most protection can get the least weight.
3 Attempts have been made to es-
timate counterfactual import levels in the absence of protection. Cline, for example, computes “adjusted 
import weights” for broad sectors such as agriculture based on certain assumptions about the elasticity 
of demand and supply for imports. Bouët et al. use observed import levels of large reference groups of 
countries, which are less endogenous to protection in any one country. But neither approach is reliable in 
                                                 
3 This is not automatically so. To the extent that the political economy of protection causes barriers to be higher for goods 
with high imports, observed imports and protection will be positively correlated (Corden 1996; Cline 2002). But if this effect 
dominates, import weighting is still be biased, just in the opposite way.   3
product areas where protection is both high and widespread, as it is in agriculture, textiles, and apparel, 
the areas of most concern to developing countries. When protection is very high, extrapolated estimates 
of imports in the absence of protection become too heroic; when it is widespread, reference groups do 
not work. 
 
This paper eschews import weights as much as possible in favor of weights based on exporter’s produc-
tion—a choice that reflects our interest in the impact of protection on exporters. The value of Vietnam’s 
rice output, for example, is taken as the best available indicator of its propensity to export rice to Ja-
pan—better than its actual exports to Japan, however adjusted, and better than its exports to other coun-
tries, where it also faces barriers. This system is similar to that of the OECD (1997), with the crucial dif-
ference that it substitutes exporter’s for importer’s production. The underlying protection data come 
from Bouët et al.’s detailed MAcMap data set, while the data for production weights come from the 
Global Trade Analysis Project version 6 database. Section 1 details the methodology and uses it to 
measure protection in individual rich countries with respect to developing countries as a group, by which 
I mean essentially all countries that are not members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC). 
Section 2 integrates estimates of the tariff equivalent of agricultural subsidies, derived with the method-
ology of Cline (2002, 2004), in order to calculate overall levels of protection in rich countries from the 
developing country point of view, in agriculture specifically and goods generally. Section 3 briefly con-
cludes. 
 
1. Aggregate tariff barriers 
Antoine Bouët, Lionel Fontagné, and colleagues at the Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations 
Internationales (CEPII) and the International Trade Centre make a formidable attack on the protection-  4
measurement problem at the tariff line level in their Market Access Map (MAcMap) data set. One sign 
of the value of their work is that the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) switched to MAcMap data 
in version 6 of the GTAP modeling product. MAcMap provides ad valorem tariff equivalents of tariffs 
by importer, exporter, and 6-digit line in the Harmonized System of product classification (HS 6). The 
data set has some 35 million rows in all. The MAcMap data also factor in preferences for least devel-
oped countries. And they embody considerable effort on methodologies for converting tariff-rate quotas 
(TRQs) and specific-unit tariffs into ad valorem–equivalent simple tariffs. TRQs, which rich countries 
apply primarily in agriculture, are pairs of tariffs: a low one applies to imports within some quota, and a 
high one applies beyond. They originated in Uruguay Round commitments to “tarify” what were once 
quotas. Specific-unit tariffs, including those in TRQs, are ones expressed in physical terms such as per 
ton or head of cattle. Finally, the MAcMap data contain a fresh approach to reducing the endogeneity of 
import weights, which involves clustering importers into reference groups. The weight for a given bar-
rier is based on imports not just of the country imposing the barrier but of all countries in its group. The 
weights, like the tariff estimates, are provided for each combination of importer, exporter, and HS 6 line. 
 
However, some aggregate results from MAcMap differ surprisingly from previous results. In particular, 
trade barriers in rich countries with respect to poorer countries appear quite low. (See Table 1.) Seem-
ingly, despite all the Doha Round controversy, rich-country tariffs are a minor problem for developing 
countries. And to the extent they are a problem, Australia appears to be the greatest offender, rather than 
Japan, Norway, or Switzerland, the rich countries usually seen as most protective. These results differ 
substantially from those in Cline (2004) and Kee, Nicita, and Olarreaga (2006). 
   5
Table 1. Ad valorem equivalent of trade barriers with respect to middle-income and least-developed coun-
try exporters, 2001 (%) 
Importer 
Middle-income 
exporters LDC  exporters
Australia 5.6  8.4 
Canada 3.1  6.3 
EU-15 2.7  0.8 
Japan 4.1  2.0 
New Zealand  2.8  4.0 
Switzerland 3.5  0.6 
United States  2.6  5.9 
Source: Bouët et al. (2004). 
 
 
Motivated by the need to update and refine the trade component of the Commitment to Development 
Index for 2005 (Roodman 2006a), I obtained the MAcMap data set and explored alternative aggregation 
approaches. The goal was to take advantage of the MAcMap authors’ careful work at the sub–HS 6 level 
while investigating and correcting potential endogeneity problems that would explain results like those 
in Table 1. The main concern is that MAcMap’s use of reference groups still produces import weights 
that are substantially endogenous. In particular, agricultural protection, which turns out to drive overall 
results, is high in most rich countries.  
 
To reduce the endogeneity, I experiment with what can be thought of as four distinct changes to the 
MAcMap aggregation. The thrust throughout is to base weights on the value of exporter’s production 
rather than exports. But production figures are not available at the high resolution of HS 6. The best 
available data appear to be from the GTAP 6.0 database; there one can find the value of world produc-
tion of goods and services broken down by 87 country/regions and 57 product groups.
4 Taking advan-
tage of this data for weighting therefore requires that the MAcMap data be aggregated in two steps: first 
                                                 
4 The 57 include services, which are not relevant here because MAcMap, like all such databases, lacks information on protec-
tion in services.   6
to the GTAP level, then to the universal level. This must be done along each of two dimensions: product 
groups and exporters. Thus there are four aggregation steps, and in each step I experiment with one 
change: 
1)  To aggregate across HS 6 lines within GTAP product categories, I use MAcMap weights 
or simple averaging—whichever gives the higher number. This increases the sensitivity 
to the phenomenon of high barriers across an entire reference group of importers for a 
given product. 
2)  To aggregate across countries within a GTAP region, I weight by exchange-rate GDP 
rather than MAcMap weights. This is relevant only for GTAP regions that in fact consist 
of more than one country, such as “Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa.” GDP is a coarse indica-
tor of propensity to export, but has the advantage of not being very endogenous to protec-
tion faced, and does distinguish appropriately between large and small countries. 
3)  To aggregate across GTAP regions, to the full universe of non-DAC countries, I weight 
by the value of exporter’s production in the product category. 
4)  To aggregate across GTAP product groups to the full universe of traded goods, I weight 
in the same manner. 
These steps reduce but do not eliminate endogeneity. Production too is endogenous to protection faced; 
even GDP is to some extent. Moreover, the partial reliance on MAcMap weighting within GTAP prod-
uct categories (change 1) also means that imports still enter. 
 
To investigate the relative significance of these changes, I perform six variants of the original MAcMap 
aggregation—the aggregation, that is, that relies purely on MAcMap’s distinctive reference group im-
port weights. Variant 1 makes changes 1 and 2—and performs the modified steps in that order—but uses   7
MAcMap weights thereafter, in order to determine the importance of changing how data are aggregated 
up to the GTAP level. Variant 2 makes changes 1–3 while Variant 3 makes only change 4 because, it 
will emerge, change 4 is the one of central importance. Variant 4 makes all the changes. Variant 5 
makes all changes too, but swaps the first two steps. If all the steps simply took weighted averages, this 
swap would have no effect. But because change 1 involves the maximum operator, order matters. 
 
Finally, Variant 6 drops change 1 but implements the other changes, and is my preferred variant; the 
maximum operator in change 1 is relatively atheoretical and turns out to have a small effect on the abso-
lute results and almost no effect on the relative results. Thus Variant 6 is a true weighted average of 
MAcMap values. It still aggregates across HS 6 lines within GTAP product groups using MAcMap 
weights, but aggregates across exporters within GTAP country/regions by exporter’s GDP and across 
GTAP product groups and country/regions by the value of exporter’s production. Table 2 has the results. 
 






weighting  1 2 3 4  5  6 
Variant 6 + export 
tax equivalents of 
textile & apparel 
quotas
 
Australia 5.44  5.71  5.62  4.36 4.73 4.49 4.36 4.36
Canada  3.04 3.33 3.21 4.23 4.51 4.39 3.93 4.77
EU-15  2.66 3.06 2.96 8.19 8.42 8.86 7.46 9.13
Japan 3.48  4.25  4.21  25.76 29.48 28.32 26.90 26.90
New Zealand  2.64  2.99  2.97 2.31 3.03 2.77 2.55 2.55
Norway 3.45  4.67  4.76  16.77 19.99 19.50 16.83 16.83
Switzerland 4.11  5.30  4.80 11.25 13.27 12.97 11.00 11.00
United States  2.35  2.68  2.81 2.61 3.24 2.96 2.83 4.08
 
 
It is apparent that change 4—weighting across GTAP product groups by exporter’s production rather 
than MAcMap import weights—makes the biggest difference. To see this, note that the variants break 
into two groups going by results. Variants 1 and 2 do not make change 4 and yield results similar to the   8
MAcMap original. Variants 3–5 include change 4 (indeed, it is the only change they all share) and pro-
duce similar and generally higher values. This suggests that product areas in which protection is high 
and widespread in rich countries are systematically de-emphasized when using pure MAcMap weights. 
It also goes a long way to explaining the difference between the MAcMap aggregates in Table 1 and 
those in, for example, Cline (2002, 2004).  
 
The detailed appendix Table A–1 further illuminates the key difference. It has one row for each rich-
country importer and GTAP product group. The “tariffs” column shows the estimated tariff level by im-
porter and product group, as used in the preferred Variant 6—tariff levels derived, that is, by aggregat-
ing across HS 6 lines to GTAP product categories by MAcMap weight, and across countries to GTAP 
regions by GDP. The next column shows the MAcMap weights for each importer–product group com-
bination. The one after shows weights based on exporters’ production. Both weight sets are adjusted to 
sum to 100% for each importer. (The next section explains the final two columns.) In agricultural cate-
gories, most exporter’s production weights are much higher than MAcMap weights. For example, the 
EU’s estimated 90% tariff on sugar from non-DAC countries gets only 0.15% weight in the MAcMap 
system but 0.76% going by exporter’s production, a 5-fold difference. By the same token, MAcMap 
gives more weight to manufactures, where rich-country protection is generally low—but where Austra-
lian protection is relatively high. This explains the poor relative result for Australia in the pure MAcMap 
approach. 
 
Given the high protection levels throughout the group of rich countries in certain categories, especially 
agriculture, it seems likely that the MAcMap reference-group system, when used for aggregation across 
major product categories, leads to substantial underestimates of protection. A similar endogeneity bias   9
may also operate within product groups, but the similarity of results between Variants 5 and 6 (which 
differ only in whether they use the simple average as a floor for the MacMAp-weighted average) offers 
reassurance that the bias is not too large. It might be argued that exporter’s production weights are also 
misleading, that Thailand and Vietnam have much less propensity to export rice than produce it. But 
then why do rich countries maintain such high barriers against them? 
 
These estimates are for the data year of 2001, at which time Canada, the European Union, and the 
United States maintained textile and apparel import quotas. Francois and Spinanger estimate the export 
tax equivalents of these quotas. I use the version of their estimates that are free of some constraints im-
posed for consistency with GTAP 6.0. The final column of Table 2 shows what happens when these ex-
port tax equivalents are chained with tariffs in the GTAP “textiles” and “wearing apparel” categories. 
Since the quotas ended on January 1, 2005, they are left out of all results reported hereafter. 
 
Table 3 and Table 4 decompose the results for the preferred Variant 6 by exporter’s region and income 
group, using World Bank definitions of these categories. There is some evidence that rich countries erect 
the highest barriers against those regions with which they have the most propensity to trade. Japan’s pro-
tection is highest against its neighbors in Asia while the Swiss and Norwegians put the highest tariffs on 
goods from the Americas, with Eastern Europe a close second. More importantly, in the stratification by 
income group, there is little sign that preferences for the poorest countries are a major factor. (“Upper 
income” here refers to non-DAC exporters such as Hong Kong and Slovenia.) EU tariffs against low-
income countries average 6.54%, only slightly below the 7.84% for lower-middle income countries, and 
well above the 3.85% for high-income countries. Norwegian and Swiss tariffs are actually measured as 
higher for low-income countries that lower-middle income ones. And the highest number in the table is   10
for Japan’s protection with respect to low-income countries, a striking 40.12%. 
 











Australia 4.7  4.5 4.1 4.2 3.2 
Canada 4.1  3.8 3.7 4.3 2.2 
EU-15 7.6  8.9 4.6 5.5 4.3 
Japan 15.8  36.0 19.4 18.3 21.7 
New Zealand  2.4  3.0 1.6 2.3 1.5 
Norway 21.2  13.7 15.2 20.6 16.5 
Switzerland 16.8  7.2 12.9 14.6 7.9 
United States  2.2  3.5 1.9 2.4 1.3 
 
Table 4. Protection with respect to non-DAC countries, 2001, by income group, Variant 6 (ad valorem 
equivalent, %) 









Australia 3.96  4.22 4.35 5.06 3.84 
Canada 3.06  3.88 4.22 3.86 3.38 
EU-15 6.54  7.84 5.95 7.13 3.85 
Japan 40.12  25.02 13.85 25.47 14.79 
New Zealand  4.95  2.45 2.18 2.85 1.89 
Norway 18.81  16.39 18.80 5.64 8.62 
Switzerland 11.89  9.88 13.74 6.43 9.38 
United States  2.29  3.11 2.05 2.83 1.85 
 
2. A closer look at agriculture 
Especially now that the old quotas on textiles and apparel have been abolished, domestic agricultural 
subsidies loom as the most important non-tariff trade impediment maintained by rich countries. It is of-
ten said that OECD governments spend $300 billion a year subsidizing agricultural production. Al-
though aid to rich-country farmers is copious, the $300 billion figure is wrong, so phrased. Rather, 
OECD farmers and food buyers receive support by virtue of government policy that is equivalent to 
nearly $300 billion in subsidies, as measured by the OECD’s (2004) Total Support Estimate (TSE). 
Much of this benefit is actually delivered in the form of tariffs, which the OECD converts to subsidy 
equivalents. Much of the rest includes “general services” such as agricultural education and R&D, trans-  11
fers to consumers rather than producers, and transfers to producers in ways that create little incentive for 
additional production, thus little trade distortion. 
 
The purpose at hand is to measure government payments that distort trade, which calls for a narrower 
definition of subsidy. This section offers such a definition, and how the subsidy totals generated by it are 
converted to tariff equivalents in order to allow comparison with the previous section’s results. 
 
Table 5 lays out the subsidy definition with aggregates across all agricultural products covered in order 
to give a sense of the magnitudes involved. The OECD tracks three major kinds of support: support to 
producers, general services such as agricultural extension and inspection services, and support to con-
sumers. The first major subcategory of producer support is Market Price Support (MPS, row B of the 
table), which is the additional income accruing to producers because their farmgate prices are higher 
than world prices. Governments maintain these price differentials with two kinds of border measures: 
barriers to imports and subsidies for exports. Import barriers account for the lion’s share of MPS in 
OECD countries and, because they generate transfers from domestic consumers to domestic producers, 
also show up as negative entries under support to consumers (row T). Spending on export subsidies can 
be inferred by taking the algebraic sum of MPS and transfers from consumers to producers (see row X). 
 
The other subcategories of producer support do represent government expenditure. And many of these 
are counted here as distorting production, including “Payments based on output, “Payments based on 
area planted/animal numbers,” “Counter cyclical payments,” “Payments based on input use,” and “Pay-
ments based on input constraints.” “Payments based on historical entitlements” are also counted, but at 
50 cents on the dollar. In theory, these subsidies are decoupled from present production and shouldn’t   12
distort it, but they are often administered in ways that do. For example, the U.S. formally decoupled 
many support payments in 1996—but then disbursed an extra $8.6 billion/year in “emergency assis-
tance” during 1998–2001, and in 2002 allowed farmers to update the base figures for their “decoupled” 
subsidies. And some EU payments are decoupled only at the national or regional level. Allocation 
within regions is still based on actual production (de Gorter, Ingco, and Ignacio 2003). 
 
To these are added export subsidies. Throughout, three-year averages are used because subsidy levels 
are sensitive to volatile world prices and the weather. For the countries of interest here, total trade-
distorting subsidies are estimated at $77.5 billion/year for 2001–03. Of this, only $2.7 billion is export 
subsidies, the type often singled out by NGOs and politicians   13
Table 5. Production-distorting agricultural payments and Total Support Estimate of OECD, 2001–03 aver-
ages 
  









National currency figures                  
A.  Producer Support Estimate (PSE)  1,552  7,002 102,708 5,359 221 20,741 7,586  44,239 
B.  Market Price Support (MPS)  6  3,383 58,311 4,824 174 9,438 4,353  16,836 
C.  Payments based on output  0  337 3,792 166 0 2,442 364  4,841 
D.  Payments based on area 
planted/animal numbers  37  788 28,027 0 0 3,473 905  2,902 
E. “Counter  cyclical  payments”                1,426 
F.  Payments based on historical 
entitlements 183  989 608 0 0 579 1,302  6,828 
G.  Payments based on input use  1,041  484 7,908 247 47 3,911 336  7,222 
H.  Payments based on input 
constraints 0  1 4,073 122 0 368 130  1,978 
I.  Payments based on overall 
farming income  285  909 0 0 0 530 0  2,206 
J. Miscellaneous  payments  0  111 –11 0 0 0 196   
        
K.  General Services Support Estimate 
(GSSE) 909  2455 9410 1461 220 1436 532  27159 
 
L.  Research and development  591  447 1550 54 114 688 93  2569  
M. Agricultural  schools  0  248 901 52 12 0 22  0 
N. Inspection  services  92  591 369 11 66 273 13  734   
O. Infrastructure  201  538 1973 1074 27 210 97 4125   
P.  Marketing and promotion  8  632 3138 26 0 114 65  17434  
Q. Public  stockholding  0  0 1343 46 0 14 47  123   
R. Miscellaneous  16  0 135 199 1 139 196 2174   
        
S.  Consumer Support Estimate (CSE)  –215  –3,540 –51,904 –6,732 –162 –9,209 –5,105  4,816 
T. Transfers  to  producers  from 
consumers –3  –3,324 –55,537 –4,823 –162 -10,217 –4,415  –16,833 
  Other transfers from consumers  –1  –255 –698 –1,917 0 –420 –1,031  –2,081 
U.  Transfers to consumers from 
taxpayers –211  28 3,762 5 0 520 230  23,729 
V. Excess  feed  cost  0  11 570 3 0 909 111  0 
        
W. OECD Total Support Estimate 
(A+K+U) 
2,250 9,485 115,880 6,825 441 22,697 8,348  95,127 
        
X.  Export subsidies (B+T)  3  59 2,774 1 12 –779 –62  3 
Y.  Other direct trade-distorting 
subsidies (C+D+E+F/2+G+H) 
1,170 2,105 44,104 535 47 10,484 2,386  21,783 
        
Z. Exchange  rate/$  1.75 1.5 1.01 0.12 2 7.94 1.52  1 
        
Dollar figures        
AA. OECD Total Support Estimate 
(W/Z) 
1,286 6,323 114,733 56,875 221 2,859 5,492  95,127  282,915
        
AB. Export subsidies (X/Z)  2  39 2,746 8 6 –98 –41  3  2,666
AC. Other trade-distorting subsidies 
(Y/Z) 
667 1,405 43,663 4,427 24 1,320 1,567  21,783  74,855
  Total trade-distorting subsidies 
(AB+AC) 
668 1,444 46,409 4,436 30 1,222 1,526  21,786  77,521
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The aggregate data in Table 5 do not in fact enter the calculations described here. Rather, more detailed 
data from the OECD (2004) by commodity group (beef, oats, etc.) are used, in the same way. The 
OECD and GTAP databases categorize agricultural products differently; some GTAP categories are 
subdivided in the OECD subsidy database, and vice versa in the case of rice, which GTAP splits be-
tween paddy and processed rice. In order to integrate the two agricultural data sets, I aggregate both into 
9 supercategories, 8 of which are strict GTAP categories and one of which is rice. Again, I aggregate the 
tariff estimates using production weights. 
 
The formula for translating production subsidies into tariff equivalents is based on Cline (2004, ch. 3). It 
derives from a partial equilibrium analysis that asks what uniform ad valorem tariff level would depress 
imports as much as a given production subsidy. Inputs to the formula are subsidies, s, and imports, ϕM, 
both as shares of the farmgate value of production; the ad valorem tariff equivalent of border measures, 
t; and the absolute value of the price elasticity of demand for imports, β. β is in turn estimated as σD(1–
φM), where σD is the elasticity of substitution in demand between domestic goods and imports, assumed 
to be 3.6, and φM is imports/consumption at world prices. Cline shows that, assuming that the elasticity 









⎛ + + +
s
t M ϕ  
 
Meanwhile, the proportionate reduction caused by an additional and hypothetical ad valorem tariff, τ, in 
place of the subsidy would be  
 
( )
β τ + 1  
 
                                                 
5 This is algebraically equivalent to Equation A8 of Cline 2004, Appendix 3A–2.   15




































This is the formula for the final column of Table A–2, which exhibits the calculations for each importer 
and product group.
6 Import and export data in the table are from the UNCTAD COMTRADE database, 
and are averages for 2002–03.
7 
 
The final two columns of appendix Table A–1 chain these subsidy tariff-equivalents with tariffs derived 
under Variant 6 in the previous section, in order to obtain estimates of overall protection in agriculture 
with respect to non-DAC countries. Table 6 summarizes the results for agriculture, by major commodity 
group. Table 7 performs the final aggregations, across all agriculture and across all goods. 
 
Australia and New Zealand have extremely low agricultural tariffs against developing countries, at 
0.83% and 0.37% in across-the-board ad valorem terms. New Zealand matches the low tariffs with 
                                                 
6 This is nearly equivalent to equation A10 of Cline (2004, ch. 3, appendix 3A–2), differing only in that the elasticity β enters 

















which is the first term in a Taylor expansion of the formula used here.  
 
7 2001 data are not available via the web interface for this database.   16
minimal subsidies, equivalent to just 1.09% in tariff terms; but subsidies in Australia are somewhat more 
substantial, equivalent to a 6.37% tariff. Along with the United States, the next-lowest on tariffs, these 
three countries impede agricultural imports from developing countries more through subsidies than tar-
iffs. All, however, maintain relatively low barriers in aggregate. The other rich countries, especially Ja-
pan, Norway, and Switzerland, have higher barriers, which are imposed mainly through tariffs. This is 
perhaps not surprising since tariffs are cheaper for a government than subsidies. Moreover, production 
subsidies are not as efficient at impeding imports. Paying a farmer based on outputs, inputs, etc., does 
not as directly interfere with imports. 
 
The correlations between the top and bottom halves of Table 7 suggest that agricultural protection is in 
turn the dominant source of variation in levels of overall protection in goods. An examination of the de-
tails in Table A–1 bears this out. Protection tends to be much lower in textiles, apparel, and other manu-
factures, for example. In sum, then, agricultural tariffs are the major source of difference among rich 
countries in protection with respect to poor ones. Switzerland, Norway, and Japan impose the highest 
agricultural tariffs, equivalent to uniform ad valorem tariffs of 50.86%, 89.44%, and 158.14% respec-
tively, and are also highest in overall goods protection, in the same order. 
 
The final column of Table 7 compares this paper’s results with those of Cline (2004). The differences 
are remarkably small for the EU-15 and United States, despite Cline’s use of a different methodology 
and GTAP 5 data. The factor-two difference for Japan appears to be largely explained by different esti-
mates for the tariff equivalent of rice TRQs. GTAP 5 used the simple average of the two tariffs in a 
TRQ. MAcMap uses the low rate when quotas are less than 90% filled, the simple average for fill rates 
of 90–100%, and the high rate for fill rates above 100%.GTAP 5 puts Japanese paddy and process rice   17
tariffs both at 409% (Dimaranan and McDougall 2002, p. 4–6). The MAcMap-based figures reported 
here (Table A–1) are 844% and 919%. 
Table 6. Ad valorem tariffs with respect to non-DAC countries and tariff-equivalents of subsidies, agricul-
ture, by importer and major product group (%) 
Importer   Rice  Wheat 
Corn & 
other 
















seeds  Wool 
Tariffs, 2001 
Australia  0.0 0.0 0.0 10.0 0.8 0.0 0.7 0.9 0.8 0.2
Canada  0.0 2.6 0.3 4.5 1.8 8.4 39.5 97.7 0.0 0.0
EU-15 110.8  0.7  17.2 90.4 19.1 75.8 15.2 38.0 0.0 0.0
Japan 886.7  214.4  53.2 227.0 21.4 38.2 36.5 82.4 1.6 1.2
New  Zealand  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 2.7 1.3 0.0 0.0
Norway  29.1 208.4 114.8 56.6 19.9 222.7 224.3 134.0 48.6 0.0
Switzerland 6.6  131.6  77.7 100.9 30.5 168.2 111.3 106.8 21.2 0.0
U.S.  5.2 3.2 0.9 24.2 5.0 2.6 3.3 16.7 8.7 1.6
      
Tariff equivalents of subsidies, 2001–03 
Australia  6.8 16.1 18.5 19.5 0.0 20.8 5.6 17.4  5.8 20.1
Canada  0.0 19.1 11.7 0.0 –1.3 9.3 4.8 2.7 13.2 0.0
EU-15  12.8 20.4 20.7 4.6 2.4 18.7 10.3 13.7 14.3 0.0
Japan  13.8 4.1 3.8 2.4 1.6 3.5 0.6 6.9  16.1 0.0
New  Zealand  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.8 5.3 5.7 0.0 0.0
Norway  0.0 9.5  19.5 0.0 0.0 19.3 2.4 20.7 0.0 21.5
Switzerland  0.0 11.3 12.2 6.3 0.0 13.7 6.2 20.3 16.4 0.0
U.S.  20.5 21.0 20.1 4.8 13.0 7.2 9.0 11.9 20.5 4.8
      
Tariffs & subsidies combined 
Australia  6.8 16.1 18.5 31.5 0.8 20.8 6.4 18.5  6.6 20.3
Canada  0.0 22.1 12.0 4.5 0.5 18.5 46.1 103.1 13.2 0.0
EU-15  137.8 21.2 41.5 99.2 22.0 108.6 27.2 57.0 14.3 0.0
Japan 1023.1  227.3  58.9 234.8 23.4 43.1 37.3 95.0 18.0 1.2
New  Zealand  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 5.9 8.2 7.1 0.0 0.0
Norway  29.1 237.8 156.7 56.6 19.9 284.9 232.2 182.3 48.6 21.5
Switzerland 6.6  157.7  99.5 113.5 30.5 204.9 124.4 148.8 41.0 0.0
U.S.  26.8 24.9 21.1 30.2 18.6 10.0 12.7 30.6 31.0 6.5
   18
 
Table 7. Aggregate protection in rich countries with respect to non-DAC countries, agriculture and all 
goods, uniform ad valorem equivalents 
 
Tariffs 






Memo: Cline (2004) 
Aggregate Measure 
of Protection 
Agriculture     
Australia  0.8 6.4 7.3 
Canada  10.8 2.8  14.0  52.26 
EU-15 34.4  7.7  45.7  46.37 
Japan  158.1 3.9  179.1  82.05 
New Zealand  0.4 1.1 1.5   
Norway  89.4 3.9  99.8   
Switzerland  50.9 4.5  60.1   
United States  5.0 10.7 16.4  19.92 
All goods 
Australia  4.4 1.1 5.4   
Canada  3.9 0.7 4.7  10.68 
EU-15 7.5  1.4  9.4  9.53 
Japan  26.9 2.5  32.6  15.55 
New Zealand  2.6 0.2 2.7   
Norway  16.8 0.6  18.3   
Switzerland  11.0 0.5  12.1   
United States  2.8 1.4 4.3  4.01 
Note: “Agriculture” includes the GTAP 6.0 product categories that correspond approximately to the coverage of 
the OECD subsidy database: Animal products; Cattle, sheep; Cattle, sheep meat; Dairy products; Oil seeds; 




Given the evidence that rich-country agricultural subsidies are less important for developing countries 
than tariffs, why have they received so much public attention? Table 8 borrows an idea from the Catho-
lic Agency for Overseas Development to suggest one reason. Leaving aside the trade effect, government 
payments to agriculture also consume government funds. Economists call that an opportunity cost. Ac-
tivists call it unjust. The table shows total government payments to agriculture for 2003, including pay-
ments excluded above as non-distortionary, per head of the relevant kind of livestock. Livestock figures 
are from the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization’s FAOSTAT database. Subsidies for cattle include 
those for milk, those for chicken include eggs, and those for sheep include wool. The final column 
shows Net Aid Transfers (Roodman 2006b) per poor person in developing countries, where “the poor”   19
are the 2.7 billion people living on less that $2 a day.
8 The rich countries as a whole give $106 in subsi-
dies per cow, $16 per sheep, $10 per pig, and $14.50 per poor person. 
 
Table 8. Subsidies per rich-country animal and aid per poor person, 2003 ($) 
  Subsidies per head of livestock 
 
Cattle Chickens Pigs  Sheep 
Net aid transfers per 
poor person in de-
veloping countries 
Australia 18.37  0.41 7.12 1.12 0.44 
Canada 92.19  0.46 17.34 0.00 0.71 
EU-15 200.09  0.36 10.52 35.45 11.03 
Japan 160.64  0.23 5.17 0.00 2.20 
New Zealand  2.55  0.47 0.44 0.05 0.06 
Norway 964.98  0.85 51.50 91.07 0.75 
Switzerland 985.87  2.63 140.35 15.74 0.46 
United States  41.34  0.43 6.16 2.22 5.26 




The methodology described here is not as sophisticated as the general equilibrium approach of Anderson 
and Neary and the intensely econometric techniques of Kee, Nicita, and Olarreaga. But within a rela-
tively simple conceptual framework, using high-quality and detailed data from the MAcMap data set, it 
produces plausible results. Indeed, the results make more sense that those derived purely using MAcMap 
weights, which appear to introduce substantial endogeneity bias when aggregating across major product 
groups. 
 
With respect to developing countries, New Zealand is least protective, followed by the United States, 
Canada, and Australia. EU barriers are about three times as high as those of the United States in agricul-
ture, and twice as high overall. Non-EU members Norway and Switzerland use their policy freedom to 
                                                 
8 Net Aid Transfers differs from the standard Net Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) in netting out interest payments 
received on ODA loans and cancellation of non-ODA loans.   20
erect even higher barriers, and Japan’s well-known barriers against rice rank it as most protective. Over-
all, agricultural tariffs—not the subsidies so frequently cited in the media—are the largest barrier to ex-
ports from developing countries. The public attention paid to export subsidies has also been quite dis-
proportionate. In the EU-15, for example, export subsidies are only 6.3% of all subsidies, which in turn 
are responsible for only about 20% of protection in agriculture with respect to developing countries. In 
other words, export subsidies are responsible for only 1.3% of the overall protective effect in EU agri-
culture. What partly explains the attention to agricultural subsidies is their sheer cost, which rivals 
spending on foreign aid.  21
Appendix. Detailed tables 
Table A–1. MAcMap protection and weights with respect to non-DAC countries, and production 
weights, by importer and GTAP product group (%) 












Australia  Beverages and tobacco products 0.44 2.83 15.75 0.00 15.75
Australia  Sugar cane, sugar beet 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00
Australia  Bovine meat products 0.09 0.89 0.00 20.76 20.76
Australia Coal  0.55 0.56 0.00 0.00 0.00
Australia  Chemical, rubber, plastic products  6.15 9.33 3.56 0.00 3.56
Australia  Bovine cattle, sheep and goats, horses  0.06 0.88 0.00 0.00 0.00
Australia Electronic  equipment 19.88 6.20 0.96 0.00 0.96
Australia Electricity  0.09 2.56 0.00 0.00 0.00
Australia Metal  products 1.86 2.87 5.46  0.00 5.46
Australia Forestry  0.21 0.86 0.18 0.00 0.18
Australia Fishing  0.22 0.97 0.20 0.00 0.20
Australia Gas  1.89 0.97 0.00 0.00 0.00
Australia  Gas manufacture, distribution 0.00 0.15 5.00 0.00 5.00
Australia Cereal  grains  nec 0.10 0.78 0.00  18.48 18.48
Australia Ferrous  metals 2.01 3.51 3.88  0.00 3.88
Australia Leather  products 2.53 1.55 8.04  0.00 8.04
Australia Wood  products 2.69 2.04 4.65  0.00 4.65
Australia Dairy  products 0.08 0.83 0.92  17.44 18.52
Australia Motor  vehicles  and  parts 4.87 3.63 13.86 0.00 13.86
Australia Metals  nec  3.37 2.20 0.76 0.00 0.76
Australia Mineral  products nec  1.11 4.07 3.91  0.00 3.91
Australia Animal  products nec  0.21 2.37 0.00  0.00 0.00
Australia Crops  nec  0.93 1.36 0.02 0.00 0.02
Australia Food  products  nec 2.66 4.70 1.84 0.00 1.84
Australia Oil  12.73 3.80 5.47 0.00 5.47
Australia  Machinery and equipment nec  10.40 8.00 4.04 0.00 4.04
Australia Manufactures  nec 3.78 2.85 2.74  0.00 2.74
Australia Minerals  nec  1.46 1.88 0.20 0.00 0.20
Australia Meat  products  nec 0.32 1.33 0.75 5.61 6.40
Australia Oil  seeds  0.23 0.59 0.81 5.79 6.65
Australia Transport  equipment  nec 1.79 1.64 1.92 0.00 1.92
Australia  Petroleum, coal products 2.84 4.11 0.00 0.00 0.00
Australia Processed  rice 0.05 1.13 0.00  6.79 6.79
Australia Paddy  rice  0.01 0.87 0.00 6.79 6.79
Australia Plant-based  fibers 0.08 0.34 0.00  0.00 0.00
Australia  Paper products, publishing 1.09 3.10 3.09  0.00 3.09
Australia Sugar  0.15 0.76 10.05 19.52 31.53
Australia Textiles  4.97 5.05 15.05 0.00 15.05
Australia Vegetables,  fruit, nuts  1.07 3.86 0.81  0.00 0.81
Australia Vegetable  oils  and  fats 0.50 0.74 1.03  0.00 1.03
Australia Wearing  apparel 6.43 2.66 22.18  0.00 22.18
Australia Wheat  0.05 0.79 0.00 16.11 16.11
Australia  Wool, silk-worm cocoons 0.02 0.17 0.16 20.07 20.27
Canada  Beverages and tobacco products 0.44 2.83 6.93  0.00 6.93
Canada  Sugar cane, sugar beet 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00
Canada  Bovine meat products 0.09 0.89 8.40  9.34 18.53
Canada Coal  0.55 0.56 0.00 0.00 0.00
Canada  Chemical, rubber, plastic products  6.15 9.33 1.41 0.00 1.41
Canada  Bovine cattle, sheep and goats, horses  0.06 0.88 0.00 0.00 0.00
Canada Electronic  equipment 19.88 6.20 0.13 0.00 0.13  22












Canada Electricity  0.09 2.56 0.00 0.00 0.00
Canada Metal  products  1.86 2.87 2.28 0.00 2.28
Canada Forestry  0.21 0.86 0.26 0.00 0.26
Canada Fishing  0.22 0.97 0.33 0.00 0.33
Canada Gas  1.89 0.97 0.64  0.00 0.64
Canada  Gas manufacture, distribution 0.00 0.15 5.93 0.00 5.93
Canada  Cereal grains nec 0.10 0.78 0.32  11.67 12.04
Canada Ferrous  metals  2.01 3.51 0.37 0.00 0.37
Canada Leather  products  2.53 1.55 8.30 0.00 8.30
Canada Wood  products  2.69 2.04 2.02 0.00 2.02
Canada Dairy  products  0.08 0.83 97.69 2.75 103.12
Canada  Motor vehicles and parts 4.87 3.63 3.36 0.00 3.36
Canada Metals  nec  3.37 2.20 0.05 0.00 0.05
Canada Mineral  products  nec 1.11 4.07 1.00 0.00 1.00
Canada Animal  products  nec 0.21 2.37 6.45 0.00 6.45
Canada Crops  nec  0.93 1.36 0.47 0.00 0.47
Canada Food  products  nec 2.66 4.70 4.38  0.00 4.38
Canada Oil  12.73 3.80 0.00 0.00 0.00
Canada  Machinery and equipment nec  10.40 8.00 1.09  0.00 1.09
Canada Manufactures  nec  3.78 2.85 1.42 0.00 1.42
Canada Minerals  nec  1.46 1.88 0.00 0.00 0.00
Canada  Meat products nec 0.32 1.33 39.48  4.76 46.11
Canada Oil  seeds  0.23 0.59 0.00 13.20 13.20
Canada  Transport equipment nec 1.79 1.64 7.61  0.00 7.61
Canada  Petroleum, coal products 2.84 4.11 0.27 0.00 0.27
Canada Processed  rice  0.05 1.13 0.00 0.00 0.00
Canada Paddy  rice  0.01 0.87 0.00 0.00 0.00
Canada Plant-based  fibers 0.08 0.34 0.00  0.00 0.00
Canada  Paper products, publishing 1.09 3.10 0.08  0.00 0.08
Canada Sugar  0.15 0.76 4.46 0.00 4.46
Canada Textiles  4.97 5.05 11.41 0.00 11.41
Canada  Vegetables, fruit, nuts 1.07 3.86 1.76  -1.26 0.48
Canada  Vegetable oils and fats 0.50 0.74 2.24  0.00 2.24
Canada Wearing  apparel  6.43 2.66 15.31 0.00 15.31
Canada Wheat  0.05 0.79 2.57 19.09 22.15
Canada  Wool, silk-worm cocoons 0.02 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00
EU-15  Beverages and tobacco products 0.44 2.83 10.54  0.00 10.54
EU-15  Sugar cane, sugar beet 0.00 0.19 71.85 0.00 71.85
EU-15  Bovine meat products 0.09 0.89 75.79  18.66 108.58
EU-15 Coal  0.55 0.56 0.00 0.00 0.00
EU-15  Chemical, rubber, plastic products  6.15 9.33 1.32 0.00 1.32
EU-15  Bovine cattle, sheep and goats, horses  0.06 0.88 15.44 0.00 15.44
EU-15 Electronic  equipment 19.88 6.20 0.85 0.00 0.85
EU-15 Electricity  0.09 2.56 0.00 0.00 0.00
EU-15 Metal  products  1.86 2.87 1.26 0.00 1.26
EU-15 Forestry  0.21 0.86 0.14 0.00 0.14
EU-15 Fishing  0.22 0.97 4.63 0.00 4.63
EU-15 Gas  1.89 0.97 0.00 0.00 0.00
EU-15  Gas manufacture, distribution 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.00
EU-15  Cereal grains nec 0.10 0.78 17.25  20.72 41.55
EU-15 Ferrous  metals  2.01 3.51 3.38 0.00 3.38
EU-15 Leather  products  2.53 1.55 5.62 0.00 5.62
EU-15 Wood  products  2.69 2.04 0.41 0.00 0.41
EU-15 Dairy  products  0.08 0.83 38.02 13.73 56.97
EU-15  Motor vehicles and parts 4.87 3.63 2.73 0.00 2.73  23












EU-15 Metals  nec  3.37 2.20 1.61 0.00 1.61
EU-15 Mineral  products  nec 1.11 4.07 2.37 0.00 2.37
EU-15 Animal  products  nec 0.21 2.37 4.84 0.00 4.84
EU-15 Crops  nec  0.93 1.36 2.14 0.00 2.14
EU-15 Food  products  nec 2.66 4.70 9.16  0.00 9.16
EU-15 Oil  12.73 3.80 0.00 0.00 0.00
EU-15  Machinery and equipment nec  10.40 8.00 0.45  0.00 0.45
EU-15 Manufactures  nec  3.78 2.85 1.15 0.00 1.15
EU-15 Minerals  nec  1.46 1.88 0.16 0.00 0.16
EU-15  Meat products nec 0.32 1.33 15.24  10.35 27.16
EU-15 Oil  seeds  0.23 0.59 0.00 14.27 14.27
EU-15  Transport equipment nec 1.79 1.64 1.16  0.00 1.16
EU-15  Petroleum, coal products 2.84 4.11 0.63 0.00 0.63
EU-15 Processed  rice  0.05 1.13 137.22 12.83 167.64
EU-15 Paddy  rice  0.01 0.87 76.62 12.83 99.28
EU-15 Plant-based  fibers 0.08 0.34 0.00  0.00 0.00
EU-15  Paper products, publishing 1.09 3.10 0.14  0.00 0.14
EU-15 Sugar  0.15 0.76 90.37 4.63 99.19
EU-15 Textiles  4.97 5.05 5.90 0.00 5.90
EU-15 Vegetables,  fruit,  nuts 1.07 3.86 19.12 2.40 21.98
EU-15  Vegetable oils and fats 0.50 0.74 4.92  0.00 4.92
EU-15 Wearing  apparel  6.43 2.66 6.45 0.00 6.45
EU-15 Wheat  0.05 0.79 0.67 20.36 21.17
EU-15  Wool, silk-worm cocoons 0.02 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00
Japan  Beverages and tobacco products 0.44 2.83 16.39  0.00 16.39
Japan  Sugar cane, sugar beet 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00
Japan  Bovine meat products 0.09 0.89 38.22  3.50 43.05
Japan Coal  0.55 0.56 0.01 0.00 0.01
Japan  Chemical, rubber, plastic products  6.15 9.33 0.44 0.00 0.44
Japan  Bovine cattle, sheep and goats, horses  0.06 0.88 53.60 0.00 53.60
Japan Electronic  equipment 19.88 6.20 0.00 0.00 0.00
Japan Electricity  0.09 2.56 0.00 0.00 0.00
Japan Metal  products  1.86 2.87 0.13 0.00 0.13
Japan Forestry  0.21 0.86 0.79 0.00 0.79
Japan Fishing  0.22 0.97 4.04 0.00 4.04
Japan Gas  1.89 0.97 2.60 0.00 2.60
Japan  Gas manufacture, distribution 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.00
Japan  Cereal grains nec 0.10 0.78 53.18  3.75 58.93
Japan Ferrous  metals  2.01 3.51 0.39 0.00 0.39
Japan Leather  products  2.53 1.55 14.55 0.00 14.55
Japan Wood  products  2.69 2.04 0.64 0.00 0.64
Japan Dairy  products  0.08 0.83 82.44 6.90 95.03
Japan  Motor vehicles and parts 4.87 3.63 0.00 0.00 0.00
Japan Metals  nec  3.37 2.20 0.37 0.00 0.37
Japan Mineral  products  nec 1.11 4.07 0.16 0.00 0.16
Japan Animal  products  nec 0.21 2.37 11.02 0.00 11.02
Japan Crops  nec  0.93 1.36 1.27 0.00 1.27
Japan Food  products  nec 2.66 4.70 12.11  0.00 12.11
Japan Oil  12.73 3.80 0.00 0.00 0.00
Japan  Machinery and equipment nec  10.40 8.00 0.04  0.00 0.04
Japan Manufactures  nec  3.78 2.85 0.81 0.00 0.81
Japan Minerals  nec  1.46 1.88 0.39 0.00 0.39
Japan  Meat products nec 0.32 1.33 36.55  0.56 37.31
Japan Oil  seeds  0.23 0.59 1.62 16.09 17.97
Japan  Transport equipment nec 1.79 1.64 0.00  0.00 0.00  24












Japan  Petroleum, coal products 2.84 4.11 2.83 0.00 2.83
Japan Processed  rice  0.05 1.13 919.46 13.82 1060.37
Japan Paddy  rice  0.01 0.87 844.37 13.82 974.91
Japan Plant-based  fibers 0.08 0.34 0.00  0.00 0.00
Japan  Paper products, publishing 1.09 3.10 0.18  0.00 0.18
Japan Sugar  0.15 0.76 227.02 2.38 234.80
Japan Textiles  4.97 5.05 6.13 0.00 6.13
Japan Vegetables,  fruit,  nuts 1.07 3.86 21.41 1.65 23.41
Japan  Vegetable oils and fats 0.50 0.74 4.83  0.00 4.83
Japan Wearing  apparel  6.43 2.66 9.73 0.00 9.73
Japan Wheat  0.05 0.79 214.41 4.11 227.34
Japan  Wool, silk-worm cocoons 0.02 0.17 1.15 0.00 1.15
New Zealand  Beverages and tobacco products  0.44 2.90 16.30 0.00 16.30
New Zealand  Sugar cane, sugar beet  0.00 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00
New Zealand  Bovine meat products 0.09 0.92 0.04 5.82 5.86
New Zealand  Coal  0.55 0.57 0.00 0.00 0.00
New Zealand  Chemical, rubber, plastic products  6.16 9.58 2.04 0.00 2.04
New Zealand  Bovine cattle, sheep and goats, horses  0.06 0.90 0.00 0.00 0.00
New Zealand  Electronic equipment 19.90 6.36 1.14 0.00 1.14
New Zealand  Metal products 1.87 2.95 2.94  0.00 2.94
New Zealand  Forestry  0.21 0.89 0.03 0.00 0.03
New Zealand  Fishing  0.22 0.99 0.31 0.00 0.31
New Zealand  Gas  1.89 1.00 0.00  0.00 0.00
New Zealand  Gas manufacture, distribution 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.00
New Zealand  Cereal grains nec  0.10 0.81 0.00  0.00 0.00
New Zealand  Ferrous metals 2.01 3.60 1.91  0.00 1.91
New Zealand  Leather products 2.53 1.59 6.17  0.00 6.17
New Zealand  Wood products 2.70 2.09 3.42  0.00 3.42
New Zealand  Dairy products 0.08 0.85 1.33  5.71 7.12
New Zealand  Motor vehicles and parts  4.88 3.73 6.23 0.00 6.23
New Zealand  Metals nec 3.37 2.26 0.44  0.00 0.44
New Zealand  Mineral products nec  1.11 4.18 2.27  0.00 2.27
New Zealand  Animal products nec  0.21 2.43 0.36  0.00 0.36
New Zealand  Crops nec  0.93 1.40 0.45 0.00 0.45
New Zealand  Food products nec 2.66 4.83 1.56 0.00 1.56
New Zealand  Oil  12.74 3.90 0.00 0.00 0.00
New Zealand  Machinery and equipment nec  10.40 8.21 2.53 0.00 2.53
New Zealand  Manufactures nec 3.78 2.92 2.41 0.00 2.41
New Zealand  Minerals nec 1.46 1.92 0.00  0.00 0.00
New Zealand  Meat products nec  0.32 1.36 2.71  5.31 8.16
New Zealand  Oil seeds  0.23 0.60 0.00 0.00 0.00
New Zealand  Transport equipment nec  1.80 1.68 1.35  0.00 1.35
New Zealand  Petroleum, coal products 2.85 4.21 0.68 0.00 0.68
New Zealand  Processed rice 0.05 1.16 0.00  0.00 0.00
New Zealand  Paddy rice 0.01 0.90 0.00  0.00 0.00
New Zealand  Plant-based fibers 0.08 0.35 0.00  0.00 0.00
New Zealand  Paper products, publishing 1.09 3.19 1.60  0.00 1.60
New Zealand  Sugar  0.15 0.78 0.00 0.00 0.00
New Zealand  Textiles  4.97 5.18 5.93 0.00 5.93
New Zealand  Vegetables, fruit, nuts  1.07 3.96 0.07  0.00 0.07
New Zealand  Vegetable oils and fats  0.50 0.76 0.40  0.00 0.40
New Zealand  Wearing apparel 6.43 2.73 11.58  0.00 11.58
New Zealand  Wheat  0.05 0.81 0.00 0.00 0.00
New Zealand  Wool, silk-worm cocoons 0.02 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00
Norway  Beverages and tobacco products 0.44 2.83 22.33 0.00 22.33  25












Norway  Sugar cane, sugar beet 0.00 0.19 137.51 0.00 137.51
Norway  Bovine meat products 0.09 0.89 222.73  19.28 284.94
Norway Coal  0.55 0.56 0.00  0.00 0.00
Norway  Chemical, rubber, plastic products  6.15 9.33 0.10 0.00 0.10
Norway  Bovine cattle, sheep and goats, horses  0.06 0.88 106.20 0.00 106.20
Norway Electronic  equipment 19.88 6.20 0.00 0.00 0.00
Norway Electricity  0.09 2.56 0.00 0.00 0.00
Norway Metal  products 1.86 2.87 0.03  0.00 0.03
Norway Forestry  0.21 0.86 0.46 0.00 0.46
Norway Fishing  0.22 0.97 0.36  0.00 0.36
Norway Gas  1.89 0.97 0.00  0.00 0.00
Norway  Gas manufacture, distribution 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.00
Norway  Cereal grains nec 0.10 0.78 114.80  19.53 156.75
Norway Ferrous  metals 2.01 3.51 0.00  0.00 0.00
Norway Leather  products 2.53 1.55 2.70  0.00 2.70
Norway Wood  products  2.69 2.04 0.01 0.00 0.01
Norway Dairy  products  0.08 0.83 134.00 20.65 182.33
Norway Motor  vehicles  and  parts 4.87 3.63 0.00 0.00 0.00
Norway Metals  nec  3.37 2.20 0.02 0.00 0.02
Norway Mineral  products  nec 1.11 4.07 0.00 0.00 0.00
Norway Animal  products  nec 0.21 2.37 88.10 0.00 88.10
Norway Crops  nec  0.93 1.36 9.49 0.00 9.49
Norway Food  products  nec 2.66 4.70 29.00  0.00 29.00
Norway Oil  12.73 3.80 0.00 0.00 0.00
Norway  Machinery and equipment nec  10.40 8.00 0.01  0.00 0.01
Norway Manufactures  nec 3.78 2.85 0.03  0.00 0.03
Norway Minerals  nec  1.46 1.88 0.00 0.00 0.00
Norway  Meat products nec 0.32 1.33 224.28  2.45 232.22
Norway Oil  seeds  0.23 0.59 48.60 0.00 48.60
Norway Transport  equipment  nec 1.79 1.64 0.04 0.00 0.04
Norway  Petroleum, coal products 2.84 4.11 0.00 0.00 0.00
Norway Processed  rice 0.05 1.13 27.06  0.00 27.06
Norway Paddy  rice  0.01 0.87 31.75 0.00 31.75
Norway Plant-based  fibers 0.08 0.34 0.00  0.00 0.00
Norway  Paper products, publishing 1.09 3.10 0.00  0.00 0.00
Norway Sugar  0.15 0.76 56.58 0.00 56.58
Norway Textiles  4.97 5.05 4.07 0.00 4.07
Norway Vegetables,  fruit,  nuts 1.07 3.86 19.95 0.00 19.95
Norway Vegetable  oils  and  fats 0.50 0.74 49.05  0.00 49.05
Norway Wearing  apparel 6.43 2.66 3.85  0.00 3.85
Norway Wheat  0.05 0.79 208.40 9.54 237.82
Norway  Wool, silk-worm cocoons 0.02 0.17 0.00 21.53 21.53
Switzerland  Beverages and tobacco products  0.44 2.83 16.22 0.00 16.22
Switzerland  Sugar cane, sugar beet  0.00 0.19 7.32 0.00 7.32
Switzerland  Bovine meat products 0.09 0.89 168.16 13.72 204.95
Switzerland Coal  0.55 0.56 0.49 0.00 0.49
Switzerland  Chemical, rubber, plastic products  6.15 9.33 1.03 0.00 1.03
Switzerland  Bovine cattle, sheep and goats, horses  0.06 0.88 4.10 0.00 4.10
Switzerland Electronic  equipment 19.88 6.20 0.43 0.00 0.43
Switzerland Electricity 0.09 2.56 0.00 0.00 0.00
Switzerland Metal  products 1.86 2.87 1.18  0.00 1.18
Switzerland Forestry  0.21 0.86 0.59 0.00 0.59
Switzerland Fishing  0.22 0.97 0.11 0.00 0.11
Switzerland Gas  1.89 0.97 0.00 0.00 0.00
Switzerland  Gas manufacture, distribution 0.00 0.15 0.01 0.00 0.01  26












Switzerland Cereal  grains nec  0.10 0.78 77.72  12.24 99.46
Switzerland Ferrous  metals 2.01 3.51 0.95  0.00 0.95
Switzerland Leather  products 2.53 1.55 1.06  0.00 1.06
Switzerland Wood  products 2.69 2.04 1.37  0.00 1.37
Switzerland Dairy  products 0.08 0.83 106.84  20.30 148.82
Switzerland Motor  vehicles  and parts  4.87 3.63 1.23 0.00 1.23
Switzerland Metals  nec 3.37 2.20 0.70  0.00 0.70
Switzerland Mineral  products nec  1.11 4.07 1.94  0.00 1.94
Switzerland Animal  products nec  0.21 2.37 7.65  0.00 7.65
Switzerland Crops  nec  0.93 1.36 8.18 0.00 8.18
Switzerland Food  products  nec 2.66 4.70 14.02 0.00 14.02
Switzerland Oil  12.73 3.80 0.00 0.00 0.00
Switzerland  Machinery and equipment nec  10.40 8.00 0.74 0.00 0.74
Switzerland Manufactures  nec 3.78 2.85 22.70 0.00 22.70
Switzerland Minerals  nec 1.46 1.88 3.58  0.00 3.58
Switzerland Meat  products  nec 0.32 1.33 111.32 6.19 124.40
Switzerland Oil  seeds  0.23 0.59 21.20 16.38 41.04
Switzerland Transport  equipment nec  1.79 1.64 0.72  0.00 0.72
Switzerland Petroleum,  coal  products 2.84 4.11 0.02 0.00 0.02
Switzerland Processed  rice 0.05 1.13 7.11  0.00 7.11
Switzerland Paddy  rice 0.01 0.87 5.84  0.00 5.84
Switzerland Plant-based  fibers 0.08 0.34 0.00  0.00 0.00
Switzerland  Paper products, publishing 1.09 3.10 2.51  0.00 2.51
Switzerland Sugar  0.15 0.76 100.89 6.28 113.52
Switzerland Textiles  4.97 5.05 5.25 0.00 5.25
Switzerland Vegetables,  fruit, nuts  1.07 3.86 30.55 0.00 30.55
Switzerland Vegetable  oils  and fats  0.50 0.74 26.55 0.00 26.55
Switzerland Wearing  apparel 6.43 2.66 4.55  0.00 4.55
Switzerland Wheat  0.05 0.79 131.60 11.28 157.73
Switzerland Wool,  silk-worm  cocoons 0.02 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00
United States  Beverages and tobacco products  0.44 2.83 2.67  0.00 2.67
United States  Sugar cane, sugar beet  0.00 0.19 0.25 0.00 0.25
United States  Bovine meat products 0.09 0.89 2.59 7.20 9.98
United States  Coal  0.55 0.56 0.00 0.00 0.00
United States  Chemical, rubber, plastic products  6.15 9.33 2.15 0.00 2.15
United States  Bovine cattle, sheep and goats, horses  0.06 0.88 0.11 0.00 0.11
United States  Electronic equipment 19.88 6.20 0.43 0.00 0.43
United States  Electricity 0.09 2.56 0.00 0.00 0.00
United States  Metal products 1.86 2.87 1.75  0.00 1.75
United States  Forestry 0.21 0.86 0.16  0.00 0.16
United States  Fishing 0.22 0.97 0.28  0.00 0.28
United States  Gas  1.89 0.97 0.00 0.00 0.00
United States  Gas manufacture, distribution 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.00
United States  Cereal grains nec  0.10 0.78 0.88  20.07 21.13
United States  Ferrous metals 2.01 3.51 1.21  0.00 1.21
United States  Leather products 2.53 1.55 9.80  0.00 9.80
United States  Wood products 2.69 2.04 0.61  0.00 0.61
United States  Dairy products 0.08 0.83 16.67  11.90 30.55
United States  Motor vehicles and parts  4.87 3.63 2.28 0.00 2.28
United States  Metals nec 3.37 2.20 1.01 0.00 1.01
United States  Mineral products nec  1.11 4.07 3.59 0.00 3.59
United States  Animal products nec  0.21 2.37 0.44 0.00 0.44
United States  Crops nec 0.93 1.36 2.71  0.00 2.71
United States  Food products nec  2.66 4.70 3.13 0.00 3.13
United States  Oil  12.73 3.80 0.00 0.00 0.00  27












United States  Machinery and equipment nec  10.40 8.00 1.38 0.00 1.38
United States  Manufactures nec  3.78 2.85 1.60  0.00 1.60
United States  Minerals nec 1.46 1.88 0.09 0.00 0.09
United States  Meat products nec  0.32 1.33 3.35 9.03 12.68
United States  Oil seeds 0.23 0.59 8.71  20.48 30.97
United States  Transport equipment nec  1.79 1.64 1.05 0.00 1.05
United States  Petroleum, coal products  2.84 4.11 1.02 0.00 1.02
United States  Processed rice 0.05 1.13 5.21  20.50 26.78
United States  Paddy rice 0.01 0.87 5.19  20.50 26.76
United States  Plant-based fibers 0.08 0.34 0.99  0.00 0.99
United States  Paper products, publishing 1.09 3.10 0.18 0.00 0.18
United States  Sugar  0.15 0.76 24.22 4.78 30.16
United States  Textiles 4.97 5.05 9.81  0.00 9.81
United States  Vegetables, fruit, nuts  1.07 3.86 4.98 12.98 18.61
United States  Vegetable oils and fats  0.50 0.74 2.98  0.00 2.98
United States  Wearing apparel 6.43 2.66 11.27 0.00 11.27
United States  Wheat  0.05 0.79 3.19 21.05 24.91
United States  Wool, silk-worm cocoons  0.02 0.17 1.62 4.82 6.51
1 MAcMap values aggregated across HS 6 lines by MAcMap weights and across exporters by exporter’s GDP. 
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    (million $)  (%)  (million $)  (%)  (million $)  (%)    (%) 
Australia  Beef & sheepmeat  4,391  1,479 0.00 4 3,220 0 133 3.04 1,175 0.38 358.64
Australia 
Corn & other 
grains 1,656  1,514 0.00 5 485 0 26 1.54 1,176 0.42 358.50
Australia Dairy,  eggs  1,928  988 0.92 185 1,494 0 200 10.39 602 30.76 249.27
Australia Oil  seeds  598  131 0.81 32 71 0 9 1.46 555 5.77 339.22
Australia 
Pork, poultry, 
other meat  1,152 1,101 0.75 142 292 0 33 2.87 994 14.30 308.54
Australia Rice  236  170 0.00 30 41 2 9 3.94 226 13.47 311.50
Australia Sugar  551  137 10.05 5 39 0 49 8.96 467 1.13 355.95
Australia 
Vegetables, fruit, 
nuts 8  12 0.81 201 674 0   –466 –43.15 515.35
Australia Wheat  1,615  491 0.00 17 1,913 0 58 3.57 –281 –5.99 381.56
Australia Wool  1,640  75 0.16 5 1,263 0 52 3.19 380 1.21 355.63
Canada  Beef & sheepmeat  4,303  2,867 8.40 610 1,424 8 298 6.92 3,156 19.34 290.36
Canada 
Corn & other 
grains  2,392 2,444 0.32 439 398 0 311 13.02 2,426 18.11 294.80
Canada Dairy,  eggs  3,266  3,480 97.69 307 252 –1 56 1.72 1,708 18.00 295.21
Canada Oil  seeds  2,760  1,753 0.00 252 484 0 270 9.79 2,528 9.95 324.17
Canada 
Pork, poultry, 
other meat  3,581  2,249 39.48 615 1,616 –4 106 2.95 1,566 39.25 218.70
Canada Rice    0.00 99 1  
Canada Sugar    4.46 249 118  
Canada 
Vegetables, fruit, 
nuts  435 461 1.76 2,774 1,213 0 60 13.68 1,988 139.53
–
142.31
Canada Wheat  1,836 753 2.57 12 1,990 29 292 15.93 –188 –6.45 383.22
Canada Wool    0.00 0 2  
EU-15  Beef & sheepmeat  21,562  22,379 75.79 2,216 849 468 12,939 60.01 13,633 16.26 301.48
EU-15 
Corn & other 
grains 27,107  25,887 17.25 920 810 59 21,634 79.81 23,229 3.96 345.73
EU-15 Dairy,  eggs  43,127  41,160 38.02 1,374 5,163 642 2,478 5.75 27,458 5.00 341.99
EU-15 Oil  seeds  6,349  11,818 0.00 5,658 106 0 3,540 55.75  11,902 47.54 188.85
EU-15 
Pork, poultry, 
other meat  32,899  30,630 15.24 1,952 3,413 312 1,500 4.56 27,088 7.21 334.06
EU-15 Rice  1,474  1,546 110.81 168 139 2 276 18.74 727 23.03 277.09
EU-15 Sugar  5,258  4,565 90.37 1,406 1,067 85 290 5.52  3,100 45.34 196.78
EU-15 
Vegetables, fruit, 
nuts  6,673 10,691 19.12
12,21
2 3,605 –112 183 2.74  14,208 85.95 50.59
EU-15 Wheat  13,099  11,709 0.67 1,436 1,370 12 11,808 90.15  13,078 10.98 320.47
EU-15 Wool    0.00 693 93  
Japan  Beef & sheepmeat  4,110  10,652 38.22 2,428 2 0 271 6.60 5,400 44.97 198.11
Japan 
Corn & other 
grains 446  4,919 53.18 2,722 0 0 62 13.91 3,013 90.33 34.80
Japan Dairy,  eggs  8,407  11,208 82.44 874 11 0 486 5.78 5,472 15.98 302.48
Japan Oil  seeds  225  4,342 1.62 1,573 1 0 245 108.57  1,793 87.69 44.33
Japan 
Pork, poultry, 
other meat  5,674 9,224 36.55 5,867 18 0 68 1.20 10,005 58.65 148.87
Japan Rice  31,437  35,141 886.73 231 6 0 2,974 9.46 3,410 6.76 335.67
Japan Sugar  765  2,325 227.02 310 1 0 41 5.36 543 57.17 154.20
Japan 
Vegetables, fruit, 
nuts 8,954  13,948 21.41 2,543 62 –105 147 1.64 9,856 25.80 267.10




















































Japan Wool    1.15 3 0  
N. Zealand  Beef & sheepmeat  1,889 333 0.04 26 2,141 0 9 0.46 –227 –11.24 400.47
N. Zealand 
Corn & other 
grains  133 146 0.00 8 1 0 0 0.00  140 5.96 338.53
N. Zealand  Dairy, eggs  2,526  316 1.33 37 2,797 0 13 0.52 –266 –14.07 410.66
N. Zealand  Oil seeds    0.00 5 1  
N. Zealand 
Pork, poultry, 
other meat  220  237 2.71 56 167 4 6 2.62 103 54.22 164.82
N. Zealand  Rice    0.00 19 0  
N. Zealand  Sugar    0.00 52 8  
N. Zealand 
Vegetables, fruit, 
nuts   0.07 136 685  
N. Zealand  Wheat  48  78 0.00 51 0 0 0 0.00 99 51.21 175.64
N. Zealand  Wool  316  45 0.00 0 130 0 0 0.00 186 0.14 359.50
Norway  Beef & sheepmeat  401  428 222.73 33 3 –23 382 95.15 155 21.35 283.14
Norway 
Corn & other 
grains  402 406 114.80 16 0 –1 222 55.12  203 7.82 331.86
Norway Dairy,  eggs  742 679 134.00 40 84 –8 607 81.76 274 14.74 306.92
Norway Oil  seeds    48.60 114 0  
Norway 
Pork, poultry, 
other meat  368  376 224.28 133 56 –33 12 3.30 190 69.85 108.55
Norway Rice    29.11 11 0  
Norway Sugar    56.58 62 0  
Norway 
Vegetables, fruit, 
nuts   19.95 440 3  
Norway Wheat  76 104 208.40 44 0 –1 26 34.25 69 64.19 128.90
Norway Wool  17  6 0.00 1 5 0 48 282.98  13 4.16 345.02
Switzerland  Beef & sheepmeat  705 784 168.16 149 4 –5 294 41.66  408 36.45 228.79
Switzerland 
Corn & other 
grains 122  233 77.72 41 1 0 41 33.40 108 37.46 225.16
Switzerland Dairy,  eggs  1,677  1,715 106.84 240 394 25 816 48.67 656 36.53 228.50
Switzerland Oil  seeds  39  221 21.20 29 1 0 31 79.82 61 48.17 186.59
Switzerland 
Pork, poultry, 
other meat  826 959 111.32 315 17 –47 107 12.95  689 45.71 195.45
Switzerland Rice    6.56 22 0  
Switzerland Sugar  96  200 100.89 64 3 0 16 16.22 109 59.23 146.77
Switzerland 
Vegetables, fruit, 
nuts   30.55 910 4  
Switzerland Wheat  171  335 131.60 64 0 0 59 34.60 137 46.41 192.91
Switzerland Wool    0.00 1 1  
U.S.  Beef & sheepmeat  33,463 35,915 2.59 2,984 3,849 0 1,080 3.23 31,753 9.40 326.17
U.S. 
Corn & other 
grains  24,958 20,275 0.88 467 5,790 0 5,197 20.83 19,417 2.41 351.34
U.S. Dairy,  eggs  27,022 26,744 16.67 1,477 761 0 1,565 5.79 23,877 6.19 337.73
U.S. Oil  seeds  15,280 9,822 8.71 228 7,149 0 3,190 20.88 7,135 3.20 348.48
U.S. 
Pork, poultry, 
other meat  27,270 24,330 3.35 1,583 3,871 2 861 3.16 24,100 6.57 336.35
U.S. Rice  2,146  1,261 5.20 197 534 0 1,515 70.58 1,703 11.55 318.43
U.S. Sugar  2,115  3,581 24.22 810 98 –8 144 6.82 2,415 33.56 239.19
U.S. 
Vegetables, fruit, 
nuts 15,214  9,852 4.98 8,179 6,713 0 3,272 21.51 15,957 51.25 175.49
U.S. Wheat  6,391  3,885 3.19 213 3,804 0 2,161 33.81 2,603 8.19 330.50
U.S. Wool  21  23 1.62 24 18 0 1 2.57 28 87.46 45.13
1Where σD is the elasticity of substitution in demand between domestic goods and imports, assumed to be 3.6. See Cline (2004, ch. 3).   30
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